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 Immanuel Kant predicted in Zum Ewigen
Frieden (1795/1991) that the world would
see an ever-expanding zone of peace and
commercial interaction among free republics.
This argument received renewed attention in
the 1990s, as a series of studies made use of
structured historical data and statistical
methods to test a set of hypotheses common-
ly referred to as the liberal peace:1
• Pairs of democratic states are much more
successful in maintaining peaceful rela-
tions than pairs that include at least one
non-democratic state 
• States that trade extensively with each
other will have less war than pairs of states
without such relations 
• Democracies are more peaceful internally
than other regime types. 
In this article, I review a set of studies to show
that the liberal peace hypotheses have
empirical support, but the finding is robust
only for the developed world. Democratic
states are more peaceful mainly where citizens
are well-informed and able to effectively
constrain governments, and where the insti-
tutions are well established and not at risk of
collapse. These conditions are satisfied




According to the liberal peace proposition, pairs of democratic states and pairs of states
with extensive trade ties are more peaceful than other pairs of states, and democratic states
are also more peaceful internally than other regime types. This article reviews the recent
literature on the liberal peace, and proceeds to review the literature on how factors
assoiciated with socio-economic development are related to democratization, democratic
stability, and to the risk of war. Based on this review and a set of recent empirical studies,
it argues that development is a precondition for the liberal peace. 
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1. It should be noted that the ‘liberal peace’ term is more commonly restricted to the first two components (e.g.
Oneal & Russett, 1999b; Russett & Oneal, 2001)trade largely in manufactured goods and have
diversified economies are more likely to keep
peaceful relations. This particularly applies to
rich countries. It is mainly democracies with
well-functioning state apparatuses, are rela-
tively non-dependent on natural resources,
and have well-established and consolidated
institutions that avoid civil wars. Such
democracies tend to be found in relatively
well-to-do countries. 
The article starts out by reviewing the
literature on liberalism and the liberal peace.
It then reviews a set of contributions on the
relationship between development and
democratization, and development and war
to argue that development may be a precon-
dition for the liberal peace. 
The Liberal Peace
The liberal peace may be summarized as a set
of theories arguing that there is a strong ten-
dency for domestic and international peace
to follow when the large majority of individ-
uals in a society – as contrasted to states or
governments – have control over decisions in
both political and economic issues. Liberals
in general assume that the vast majority of
individuals have self-interest in peace since
they can obtain material and non-material
well-being only during peace. Hence, peace
may be therefore be secured if narrow groups
and would-be elites can be restrained through
effective political institutions. 
Liberalism
The liberal peace literature is part of a wider
class of liberal writing. Central to liberalism
is a focus on individuals as the primary actors.
Liberal thinking on international relations
has always challenged two realist assump-
tions: The nation-state is not the only im-
portant actor in international politics (cf.
Holsti, 1995: 40)
2, and the question of war
and peace does not dominate all other issues. 
Liberal economic and political theories
have been closely related since the 18th
century. The liberal concern for the individ-
ual was emphasized by Adam Smith and
David Ricardo in their work in economics.
Kant, Paine, Bentham, James and John Stuart
Mill all argued for free trade, liberty for indi-
viduals  and for republican or democratic
government. 
The theoretical work by (liberal) econo-
mists (Smith, Ricardo, Samuelson) has
shown that trade is a positive-sum game for
most actors within the states, and that pro-
tectionism typically only benefits narrow
groups that are closely related to those having
political power. Hence, increasing state
power through trade restrictions is against the
interest of most citizens. The liberal opposi-
tion to the traditional political systems then
automatically meant an opposition to their
economic doctrine: ‘Mercantilism was seen
to arise from the nature of aristocratic states,
and therefore the political priority of liberals
was to topple the interventionist, power-
seeking state structures that were the legacy
of the eighteenth century’ (Buzan, 1984:
600). 
Realism is the main contenders to liberal-
ism among theoretical approaches to interna-
tional relations. Although the term ‘realists’
subsumes a wide variety of scholars, they
share a set of assumptions of the conditions
for international interaction (see Holsti,
1995: 36-37; Mearsheimer, 1995: 10):
Realists see the mode of organization –
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2.  Due to its view on actors, this group of theories is also referred to as pluralism (Hollis & Smith, 1991; Viotti
& Kauppi, 1987).anarchy, or the absence of any authority
above the individual, sovereign states – as the
most important feature of the international
system. Without such an authority, enforce-
ment of laws and regulations is impossible.
Given these structural conditions, the most
basic interest of states becomes survival, since
all other interests are dependent on the
existence of the state. At the same time, all
states have a potential to hurt or destroy each
other – there exists no means to ensure sur-
vival that cannot be used for attack. This is
the ‘security dilemma’: if one state increases
its security, the security of other states will
decrease (see, e.g., Snyder, 1984). The other
states, in turn, will arm to regain their relative
loss, such that in the end the first state is as
insecure as at the onset. States may never be
sure of each other’s intentions, in particular
since occupying another state is one way to
increase security. War will always be a possi-
bility in the relationship between states. For
realists, non-state actors play only sub-
ordinate parts on the world stage. 
Mercantilism used to be the economic
doctrine corresponding to realism, since the
doctrine aims at maximizing state power.
This is still reminiscent in some realist writ-
ings that emphasize relative gains versus
absolute gains. (e.g., Grieco, 1988; Powell,
1991; Mosher, 2003). However, the assump-
tion that trade is a zero-sum game has largely
been abandoned. 
Although realism is most well-known as a
theoretical approach in international rela-
tions, it also has relevance in the study of
domestic conflict. And indeed, Hobbes’
Leviathan (1651/1968), a core philosophical
contribution for realism, was written as a
defense of absolutist state power against the
background of the English civil wars of the
1640s. Realism applies where groups or indi-
viduals act in the absence of a common,
powerful authority. This is the situation in
the relations between most sovereign states,
and also in states where the government is
unable to enforce a monopoly on the use of
large-scale violence. 
The Domestic Democratic Peace
The first component of the liberal peace is
the domestic democratic peace. Democracy is
often referred to as a system for peaceful
resolution of conflicts, as conflicting claims
by rival social groups are solved by majority
votes or consensual agreements. Democracies
often also guarantee a minimum set of
individual rights and minority rights through
the constitution, and institutionalize power-
sharing mechanisms such as two-chamber
parliaments, regional self-determination, etc.
Democracies both allow discontent to be
expressed and have mechanisms to handle it.
Hence, since peaceful negotiation is feasible
and less costly, armed rebellion will not be
profitable. Thus, the literature that sees con-
flict as resulting from ‘relative deprivation’
(Gurr, 1970), clearly implies that democra-
cies should be more peaceful internally than
other regime types. If individuals are denied
the political rights and the economic benefits
they see themselves as entitled to, they will
react with aggression and organize violent
political opposition, according to this
theoretical approach. We should therefore
observe less civil war the more democratic
countries are. 
Autocracy, on the other hand, is seen as
inviting revolutions in this literature. But at
the same time, autocracies often have power-
ful mechanisms for repression (and may
make use of them without losing legitimacy,
in contrast to democracies). Autocracies
repress not only armed uprisings, but also
inhibit the formation of the organizations
that protests require before they can reach the
stage of armed insurgencies. Democracies
will also be willing to crack down on armed
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illegitimate, but may be reluctant to deny the
opposition the right to organize. 
It follows from this that regimes that
feature both democratic and autocratic
characteristics, are partly open yet lack
effective means of solving conflicts. In such
political systems, repression is difficult since
some organization of opposition groups and
some opposition expression of discontent is
allowed, but mechanisms to act on the
expressed discontent are incomplete (cf.
Davies 1962:7, Boswell & Dixon, 1990:543;
Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001).
Hence, repression is ineffective at the same
time as ‘grievance’ is not addressed.
Moreover, such institutional arrangements
are unstable because the institutions that
make up the regime are internally inconsis-
tent, and often reflect an underlying power
struggle that may erupt in open violence. I
will refer to these as inconsistent regimes. 
Changes in the political institutions of a
country are likely to be accompanied with a
heightened risk of civil war (cf. Snyder,
2000). Relevant changes are the introduction
or abolishing of elections of a parliament
and/or the executive, an increase or a decrease
in the degree to which the executive is
accountable to the parliament or other
bodies, or an increase or decrease in the share
of population that is allowed to vote. Firstly,
changes in a democratic direction are likely
to be accompanied with reduced repression,
which allows communal groups increased
opportunities for mobilization. At the same
time, it takes time to establish the new
institutions and to make them sufficiently
efficient to accommodate the kinds of
accommodation typical of established
democracy. Moreover, groups that increase
their political influence will raise their expec-
tations for real improvements in their living
conditions, but these changes can take a long
time to realize even with the best intentions.
This is likely to lead to protests, perhaps vio-
lently (Davies, 1962). The changes in the
political institutions – whether in democratic
or autocratic directions – by definition alters
the power distribution in the system (at least
in theory), which again leads to changes in
the distribution of resources within the econ-
omy. This means that some gain and others
lose. Losers then have an incentive to use
unconstitutional means or to incite armed
insurgencies to reestablish the previous status
quo. 
A number of studies find empirical con-
firmation of this ‘inverted U’ relationship:
Muller (1985), Boswell & Dixon (1990),
Muller & Weede (1990), Ellingsen (2000),
Hegre et al. (2001), de Soysa (2002), and
Fearon & Laitin (2003). Other studies, how-
ever, do not agree with these findings.
Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) find some sup-
port for the idea that inconsistent regimes are
more civil war prone than other regime types,
but conclude that the finding is not very
robust. Collier & Hoeffler (2004) find no
support for this hypothesis at all. 
Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon & Laitin
(2003) also find that political instability in
the three years previous to the year of obser-
vation doubles the risk of civil war, and
Sambanis (2001) that democratic change
increases the risk of revolutionary war.
Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002: 18) obtain
more mixed results. They conclude that
recent political instability increases the risk of
civil war in many models, but that the find-
ing is sensitive to the choice of lag structure
for the political system variable. 
The evidence for a domestic democratic
peace might not be robust
One explanation of the discrepancies in the
results for the relationship between demo-
cracy and internal conflict is that the estimate
20 Håvard Hegrefor the political system variables tends to
become insignificant when controlling for
income (GNP per capita) – as done in Collier
& Hoeffler (2004) and Elbadawi &
Sambanis (2002) – rather than energy con-
sumption per capita, as done in Hegre et al.
(2001).
3 This may not be surprising, given
the strong positive correlation between
income and democracy (see below). This
correlation is less strong between energy
consumption per capita and democracy. 
There are two additional possible explana-
tions for why we might fail to observe a
robust negative and monotonic relationship
between democracy and conflict, even if
there ‘truly’ is one: 
The first is that the conflict variable is too
heterogeneous. If (potential) armed conflict
originates in a broad social movement that
seeks to redress economic or political ‘depri-
vation’ among a majority of the population, a
democratic political system that addresses
this deprivation may have a preventive effect
(Gurr, 1970). However, if (potential) armed
conflict originates in violent efforts by mar-
ginal but well-organized groups too forward
their narrow self-interest, democratic politi-
cal systems may not be able nor willing to
meet these demands and cannot have a pre-
ventive effect (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002;
Fearon & Laitin, 2003). On the contrary,
democratic regimes’ inability to use very
repressive measures may make such predation
easier. 
Collier (2000) and Collier & Hoeffler
(2004) take this argument further by noting
that grievance/deprivation conflicts have a
tendency to be transformed to the second
type. The conflict variables typically
employed in empirical studies fail to distin-
guish between these two types. This may
explain the non-robustness of the results even
if the grievance/deprivation theory is correct.
I will discuss Collier’s argument in more
detail below. 
The second is that the democracy measure
may be too narrow. To maintain a civil peace,
democracy arguably must have the following
characteristics: the government is popularly
accountable and constrained, citizens have a
bundle of social and political rights, and the
government is capable of actively affecting
the societal distribution of resources, as well
as of preventing abuses of one social group by
another. 
Most democracy data sets measure the
extent to which governments are accountable
and constrained (although they concentrate
on ‘free and fair elections’ rather than
accountability). Only Freedom House
(annual) measures the extent to which
citizens have social and political rights, but
only imperfectly. This measure has not been
used by many studies of conflict. No direct
measure of capability exists, and measuring it
is inherently difficult. Relevant aspects of
capability are: stability (long-term credibili-
ty), consistency (absence of severe conflict
over institutional design; see Gates et al.,
2003a), taxing capacity, bureaucratic effec-
tiveness, and military effectiveness. Political
systems that combine democratic and
autocratic features may be regarded as having
low capability because of lack of consistency.
The mid-range in the Polity index employed
in Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon & Laitin’s
(2003) ‘Anocracy’ dummy serve as proxies for
the two first aspects. The inverted-U relation-
ship found in those studies indeed indicates
that capability-as-consistency may be
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3.  But note that de Soysa (2002: 412) obtains significant support for the inverted U when controlling for GDP
per capita.important. Below, I will argue that GDP per
capita is a proxy for the stability and
effectiveness of a political system, and also for
its military effectiveness. 
If citizen rights and government capa-
bility are as crucial for how democracy
reduces the likelihood of conflict as the
accountability aspect, we may fail to observe
it with the standard measures of democracy. I
will return to this below. 
Why there might not be any relationship
Collier (2000) distinguishes between two
motivations for organizing a militarized
opposition to the government. The first is
‘greed’: rebels aspire to private wealth by cap-
turing resources extra-legally. The other is
‘grievance’: rebels aspire to rid the nation – or
the group of people with which they identify
– of an unjust regime or to force through
redistribution. Gurr’s relative deprivation
theory clearly assumes the latter motivation. 
Collier argues that it is impossible to ask
rebel leaders about their ‘true’ motivations.
Leaders that are motivated by greed have an
incentive to couch the motivations in terms
of grievance rather than greed – for public
relations reasons (their private interests are
likely to be against the public interest within
the country, and are unlikely to attract inter-
national support), and for organizational/
recruitment reasons (even if recruits join the
rebel army primarily for the pecuniary bene-
fits, they will also prefer to see their activities
as a fight for a common good). 
How can researchers then conclude any-
thing about the true motivations? Collier’s
answer is to infer motivation from patterns of
observed behavior. He argues that if greed is
the dominant motivation, we would expect
to see more rebellions in countries where
there are good opportunities for financing a
rebellion: Countries in which where there is
an abundance of commodities that are easy to
obtain control over, and that are marketable
outside the country. An abundance of young
men without work and few alternative
income-earning opportunities lower recruit-
ment costs and hence increases the financial
viability of the conflict. 
If grievance is the dominant motivation,
rebellions should primarily appear in
countries with deep ethnic or religious
divisions, economic inequality, lack of politi-
cal rights, government economic impotence
and poor growth rates. Collier & Hoeffler
(2004) find that all the economic factors
listed here have explanatory power. Lack of
economic growth is the only grievance indi-
cator that is associated with a high risk of
internal armed conflict. 
Why is the ‘grievance theory’ not support-
ed? Collier (2000) points out that would-be
rebels that plan to establish an army to
address grievance face three important prob-
lems. 
The first is a collective action problem
faced by potential recruits: Justice, revenge,
and relief from grievance are public goods
and so subject to the problem of free-riding:
Whether the government gets overthrown is
not dependent on whether an individual
personally joins the rebellion. Individually,
his or her preferred choice would be that
others fight the rebellion while he or she
benefits from the justice that the rebellion
achieves. 
The second is a coordination problem.
Rebellions have to be large to be successful.
Recruits will be reluctant to join the rebel
group before it has a reasonable chance of
success, since defeat would mean death or
imprisonment. Hence, the rebel leader will
not be able to recruit before it already has
recruited a minimum number. 
The third is a time inconsistency or com-
mitment problem: The rebels have to fight
before they achieve justice, most often in the
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ment. After the victory, the rebel leader has
an incentive to act just like the replaced
government. He has a stronger incentive to
promise things than to actually deliver them.
Since successful militaries have to be organ-
ized in a strict hierarchical manner, the leader
of a victorious armed rebellion often has the
organizational apparatus required to defend
his position as head of the state even when his
followers realize that the promises have been
broken. 
The free-rider, coordination, and time-
inconsistency problem are difficult obstacles
to overcome for grievance-motivated rebel-
lions  Solutions to the free-rider problem
regularly involve drawing on social capital
and existing patterns of tit-for-tat behavior.
Rebel groups use ethnic identities to achieve
this (Gates, 2002). This possibly explains
why internal wars tend to be ethnic in nature,
and why extremely fractionalized countries
have less civil war: If there are no sizeable
ethnic groups, the recruitment pool will be
too small. 
An alternative way to solve the free-rider,
coordination, and time-inconsistency prob-
lems is to rely on the greed of the potential
recruits – offer the soldiers a salary and allow
them to loot the territory they control. Such
incentive structures avoid the free-rider prob-
lem because soldiers are paid as they go and
immediately enjoy the benefits of rebellion;
there is no coordination problem since rebel-
lions will be able to distribute the rewards
even without outright victory, and there is no
time-inconsistency problem because rewards
are immediate. Hence, Collier (2000) argues
that greed-motivated rebellions are much
more likely than grievance-motivated ones. 
If grievance-motivated rebellions do
emerge, they are likely to be transformed to
greed-motivated ones since they in a pro-
longed war are forced to rely on the same
types of incentives as the greed-motivated
ones. Moreover, civil war tends to alter
society in ways that invite the emergence of
new rebel groups and shadowy economic
activities. Collier lists four opportunities for
profit that are created during war: People
shorten their time horizons, and become
more opportunistic. This will benefit some
types of firms more than others. There is an
increase in criminality as resources to the
police are diverted to the military or counter-
insurgency activities. This also leads to 
capital flight – markets become disrupted,
information becomes more costly and partic-
ular, and entry into trading becomes more
difficult. This creates opportunities for
monopolistic trade. Finally, the scope for
rent-seeking predation increases for the rebels
(and for the governments as they become less
open to scrutiny). 
The ‘liberal peace’ term is normally
restricted to how trade and democracy
reduces countries’ propensity to become
involved in interstate militarized conflict.
The domestic democratic peace is closely
related, however. A basic assumption is that
the vast majority of individuals have an
interest in peace. This coincides with Kant’s
point of departure, as discussed in the next
section. In the grievance-based argument,
this preference for peace requires that indi-
viduals are granted certain fundamental
rights from the elites controlling the state. In
the greed-based argument, only a narrow
minority have an interest in the organized use
of military force. In order to impose this
preference for peace on the society, political
institutions that constrain both the rulers and
more peripheral armed groups are necessary,
just as is the case in the other components of
the liberal peace. 
The literature on civil war is less explicit
on the role of economic liberty than the liter-
ature on interstate conflict (see Section 4).
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rebellions always will violate the economic
interests and rights of other citizens, since the
appropriated resources originally belonged to
them or to groups they are members of. 
The international democratic peace
The international democratic peace hypothe-
sis has spurred an enormous amount of
empirical studies since the seminal studies by
Rummel (1979, 1983), Doyle (1983ab;
1986), and Maoz & Russett (1993). In this
section, I will present Kant’s argument as well
as four modern explanations for why democ-
racies should be peaceful in relations with
each other. 
Kant’s perpetual peace
Kant’s thinking on war between states was re-
introduced to the field of international rela-
tions by Michael W. Doyle (1983ab; 1986),
and has since been the primary philosophical
reference for the democratic peace literature.
4
Kant’s vision of a perpetual peace is in par-
ticular found in Zum Ewigen Frieden (Kant,
1795/1991). Republics are peaceful since ‘the
consent of the citizens is required to decide
whether or not war is to be declared’ (p. 100): 
[I]t is very natural that they will have
great hesitation in embarking on so dan-
gerous an enterprise. For this would mean
calling down on themselves all the mis-
eries of war, such as doing the fighting
themselves, supplying the costs of the war
from their own resources, painfully mak-
ing good the ensuing devastation, and, as
the crowning evil, having to take upon
themselves a burden of debt which will
embitter peace itself and which can never
be paid off on account of the constant
threat of new wars. But under a constitu-
tion where the subject is not a citizen, and
which is therefore not republican, it is the
simplest thing in the world to go to war.
For the head of state is not a fellow
citizen, but the owner of the state, and a
war will not force him to make the slight-
est sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts,
pleasure palaces and court festivals are
concerned. He can thus decide on war,
without any significant reason, as a kind
of amusement, and unconcernedly leave it
to the diplomatic corps (who are always
ready for such purposes) to justify the war
for the sake of propriety. (p. 100)  
Kant’s idea of a democratic peace has been
the focus for a large number of studies in the
past fifteen years, studies with theoretical as
well as empirical focus.
5 Key empirical works
are Doyle (1986), Bremer (1992), and Maoz
& Russett (1992; 1993). Much of the present
work on the liberal peace builds on the
framework laid out in these articles. 
Kant’s argument has been expanded in the
modern democratic peace literature. Four
different reasons why democracies keep a
separate peace may be distinguished. The first
two were formulated by Maoz & Russett




The normative explanation holds that ‘the
culture, perceptions, and practices that per-
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4.  Kant was by no means the first to forward these ideas, though. Enlightenment theorists such as Rousseau, Mon-
tesquieu, Paine, and Godwin all precede him in arguing that states founded on democratic principles must also
be against war (Flessen, 1999: 13-17; Gates, Knutsen & Moses, 1996: 6-7).
5. See Gleditsch (1992), Chan (1997), and Gleditsch & Hegre (1997) for reviews of the literature.
6. For a critique of the normative and the structural explanations, see Rosato (2003).mit compromise and the peaceful resolution
of conflicts without the threat of violence
within countries come to apply across
national boundaries toward other democratic
countries’ (Maoz & Russett, 1993). States
‘externalize’ the norms guiding the domestic
political processes: Democratic institutions
build on norms that encourage compromise
solutions and reciprocation, and norms that
strictly inhibit the complete removal from
political life of the loser in political contest –
defeat does not mean elimination of a chance
to try again. Finally, the political process is
supposed to be completely non-violent. 
To work, the peace-preserving mechanism
of the normative explanation requires an
expectation that the other state adhere to the
same set of norms domestically – the interna-
tional system is anarchic such that no norms
or forms of behavior can be enforced ‘from
above’. The least restrictive norms then dom-
inate the democratic norms, since a demo-
cratic state is not likely to adhere to norms
that endanger their survival. A normative
explanation does not imply that democracies
are pacifist. 
A related argument is that wars of con-
quest are normatively wrong, since they by
definition are violations of the liberal prin-
ciple that citizens of the (conquered) state
have the right to elect their own leaders. Wars
of ‘liberation’, and particularly wars to
impose democracy on non-democratic states,
are an exception, since they may be instru-
mental in granting such rights to the citizens
of the conquered state. 
A structural explanation
According to the structural explanation,
democratic political leaders are required to
mobilize domestic support to their inter-
national policies. Political mobilization takes
time in democratic political system – deci-
sions have to go through the legislature, the
political bureaucracies, and key interest
groups. Executives are constrained by other
bodies (such as parliaments) which ensure
that the interests of citizens and powerful
organizations are taken into account. Debate
is public, such that information on the real
costs of war are likely to enter the decision
calculus. Shortcuts to political mobilization
can only be accomplished in situations that
can be appropriately described as emergen-
cies. Democratic political leaders will be
removed from office if they fail to evaluate
this correctly. These institutional/structural
factors slow down the decision process and
helps avoiding capricious or ill-informed
behavior. 
Moreover, as Kant argues, citizens typical-
ly perceive costs of war to be high. Hence,
they will be more reluctant to grant such
support where they are able to influence
foreign policy than will more narrow groups
(such as aristocracies, military leaders,
particular interest groups) when they have
influence. 
A signaling explanation
A third explanation is based on a signaling
argument. An important group of theories 
in international relations model war as a
bargaining process ‘under the shadow of
power’ – i.e., a negotiation where the threat
of the use of force is used by one or both
parties to attempt to improve their bargain-
ing position (Fearon, 1995; Gartzke, 1999;
Morrow, 1999; Powell, 1996; Wagner, 2000).
In these theories, the fact that we observe war
is a puzzle: There will always exist a nego-
tiated solution that is preferable to war for
both sides. Why are states not able to agree to
this solution ‘in the shadow of power’, a solu-
tion that reflects the distribution of power
and willingness to use power (resolve)? Given
the incentives to avoid war (war is extremely
costly and risky), state leaders who disagree
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what they would be willing to accept rather
than fight, and then choose a mutually
acceptable bargain. 
One answer is uncertainty about the other
side’s capabilities or resolve: There will always
be an incentive to exaggerate own capabilities
or resolve in order to improve the bargaining
position. States have an incentive to mis-
represent their willingness to fight in order to
gain a better deal. Hence, merely telling each
other what they are willing to accept is not
credible. 
The idea that the outcome of a negotia-
tion is a function of the parties’ resolve and
capabilities poses a problem for the demo-
cratic peace argument: Structural constraints
and norms against the use of force in this per-
spective merely increase the costs of using
force, and reduces the resolve. Increasing the
costs of using force for side A will not
decrease the risk of side B using force, only
reducing the credibility of side A’s threat.
Reducing the credibility of the threat of using
force will only serve to weaken the bargaining
position of that side – the bargaining solution
will simply shift in B’s favor to a point where
A’s threat to use force is again credible.
Increasing both sides’ costs of using force will
not alter the net risk of using force. 
Fearon (1994) develops an alternative
explanation of the democratic peace that
builds on and is consistent with this frame-
work. His point of departure is to view inter-
national crises as public events carried out in
front of domestic political audiences. This
fact is crucial to understanding why crises
occur and how they unfold. Fearon develops
a formal model to show this: At each
moment in the model, a state can choose to
attack, back down, or escalate the crisis
further. If it backs down, its leaders suffer
audience costs – backing down is often seen
as a sign of unsuccessful foreign policy. 
The model seeks to show how states may
solve the problem of credibly signaling their
resolve. International crises are a response to
this dilemma, Fearon argues. States resort to
risky and provocative actions (such as mobi-
lization or deployment of troops) to signal
their willingness to fight. Such behavior may
not act as signals in themselves, however. If
mobilization is not very costly, it may just be
regarded as a bluff. Both parties have an
incentive to bluff, to mobilize, and then to
back down when they realize the bluff is
discovered. Even if they do not want to bluff,
they have an incentive to credibly commit
themselves to a position that they will
marginally prefer to war, since they cannot be
sure that the adversary has the correct percep-
tion of their capabilities and their resolve.
Fearon’s argument is that audience costs are
good commitment devices. Audience costs
are the costs that a leader suffers when back-
ing down. For example, what would happen
to the approval ratings of George W. Bush in
the US if he backed down from the con-
frontation with Iraq? 
Audience costs enable states to learn
about an opponent’s willingness to use force
in a dispute, since they may lead leaders on
one or both sides to become locked into their
positions and so will be unable to back down.
Hence, states with relatively high audience
costs are less likely to back down. At the same
time, they also need a lower amount of
escalation or crisis-inducing behavior to
signal intentions. Democracies have higher
audience costs because the public may
remove leaders after policy failures. Hence,
democracies may be better at signaling inten-
tions and may more credibly commit to
policies. This provides a third explanation of
why democracies are better able to maintain
peaceful relations than non-democracies. 
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A fourth explanation of the democratic peace
is derived from Rosecrance (1986). It takes
the incentives for political leaders to expand
the territory they control as its point of
departure. 
The fundamental ‘national interest’ for
democracies and autocracies alike is to secure
survival and to increase wealth. As realists
hold, ensuring survival may be the most
fundamental, because without the survival of
the state no other goals can be obtained.
Democratic leaders should be equally willing
to ensure survival of the state and the
political system as are autocratic leaders.
Democracies are therefore equally likely to go
to war when they perceive security to be
threatened. However, leaders in the two
regime types differ fundamentally with
respect to for whom they want to increase
wealth, since democratic leaders rely on the
support of a much broader constituency. This
affects their choice of strategy (See Section 2
for a discussion of the strategies available to
states). 
An autocratic leader may benefit dispro-
portionally from war. The prosperity of a
dictator typically depends on the amount of
resources that can be extracted from the
economy. Beyond a threshold, increasing the
tax rate will hurt the economy to such an
extent that tax income will not increase.
When that limit is reached, further growth in
government revenues requires an expansion
of the tax base. This can happen either
through internal growth or through military
expansion. For a dictator, it is quite certain
that territorial expansion increases prosperity.
The same holds if the head of the state is
accountable only to a distinct minority group
in the country (such as the traditional
monarch was accountable to the aristocracy),
in which case his/her policies are likely to
maximize growth for these groups only. Since
a large share of the population does not
benefit from these policies, the policies may
still be very successful even if they are not
reflected in improved utilization of resources,
or growth in GDP per capita. At the same
time, the autocratic leader is able to make
groups without political power bear a dispro-
portionate share of the costs – most notably,
to risk their life in actual fighting. 
The benefit of occupation is less certain
for the constituency of a democracy, where
the benefits to a larger extent are shared
among all political actors (at least ideally).
Since the benefits of occupation have to be
shared between almost as many as those who
have to bear the costs, the net expected utili-
ty of military conquest is much less likely to
be positive. Moreover, in order to extract
much from the conquered territory, the
population resident there have to be denied
the same political rights as the citizens of the
occupying country. This may add political
costs to the economic costs (Rosecrance,
1986). 
Consequently, the political costs of war is
much higher in democracies, as implied by
the democratic peace hypothesis. Again,
there are exceptions: A state may obtain their
citizen’s consent to risk their lives to expand
the territory of the state if the acquired land
is distributed to them, or if they otherwise
reap economic gains from the expansion. 
Limitations of the democratic peace
The debate on the democratic peace has
directed attention to a number of possible
limitations to the empirical validity of the
democratic peace. 
Firstly, it has often been noted that the
democracies are particularly peaceful only in
relation to other democracies (Small &
Singer, 1976; Chan, 1984; Gleditsch &
Hegre, 1997). Toward non-democratic states,
they are at least as belligerent as non-democ-
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Rummel, 1995; Ray, 1995, and Benoit, 1996
for opposing views and Russett & Oneal,
2001: 49–50 for a discussion). Kant
(1795/1991) warned against wars for liberal
purposes. In recent years, ‘making the world
safe for democracy’ has repeatedly been for-
warded as a justification for warfare. The
democratic peace itself gives fuel to this justi-
fication. If it holds, wars to overturn non-
democratic regimes may hinder wars in the
future. And indeed, large wars and inter-
ventions by democratic countries tend to be
followed by democratizations (Kegley &
Hermann, 1996; Mitchell, Gleditsch &
Hegre, 1999; Gates et al., 2003b; Kadera,
Crescenzi & Shannon, 2003; Christiansen,
2004; Christiansen, Gleditsch & Hegre,
2004). 
Peceny, Beer & Sanchez-Terry (2003)
investigate whether there is a separate ‘dicta-
torial peace’, but do not find such dyads to be
clearly more peaceful than the mixed dyads.
Werner (2000), on the other hand, find
‘politically similar’ states to be less likely to
engage in conflict than non-similar states.
Raknerud & Hegre (1997) find the high risk
of war in dyads consisting of one democracy
and one non-democracy to be to a large
degree due to the tendency for democracies
to become involved on the same side in
multilateral wars. 
Another issue is that young democracies
may not behave in the same manner as con-
solidated ones. Mansfield & Snyder (1995,
2002) argue that the democratization process
is dangerous. In addition to the time it takes
for democratic institutions to become
functional, the democratization process itself
tends to increase the risk of war. Both new
and old elites have an incentive to use
nationalist rhetoric to bolster their domestic
support when institutions are fragile. At the
same time, old elites are still powerful and
may have an interest in an assertive foreign
policy. Their empirical findings are con-
tested, however (Ward & Gleditsch, 1998). 
All of the four explanations listed above
require well-functioning institutions to be
effective. If the democratic institutions are
not fully functional, either because they are
young and unconsolidated or because they
are inconsistent, democratic norms at work
in the normative explanation are not likely to
be fully rooted. The structural explanation
explicitly requires that the institutions are
effective in constraining executives that
might have an interest in belligerent be-
havior. Likewise, in the signaling explana-
tion, democratic leaders do not face the same
audience costs in weak or new democracies as
in well-developed ones. And democracies will
only alter the incentives for conquests if
power-dispersion is extensive. Section 3
elaborates on how economic development is
related to these issues. 
Trade and interstate conflict
Kant (1795/1991) also anticipated the third
component of the liberal peace: that trade
between states reduces the risk of conflict
between them. Although nature separates the
nations, Kant argues, it also unites them. And
this is where the economic aspect of the
liberal peace enters Kant’s argument:7 ‘For
the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes
hold of every people, and it cannot exist side
by side with war. ... Thus states find them-
selves compelled to promote the noble cause
of peace, though not exactly from motives of
morality.’ (p. 114). Note that Kant’s argu-
ment rests on individual self-interest, not on
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setting up a [republican] state can be solved
even by a nation of devils (so long they
possess understanding)’ (p. 112). For Kant’s
state of nature is a state of war, just as is
Hobbes’ (Kant, 1975/1991: 98). 
A series of empirical studies find that
states that trade extensively have a lower risk
of interstate militarized conflict (see in
particular Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999ab;
Russett & Oneal, 2001). A few studies find
no relationship between trade and conflict
(Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998) or a positive
relationship (Barbieri, 1996ab, 2002). Some
of these studies are reviewed in more detail in
Hegre (2000; 2004). This section reviews
how modern liberal reasoning on the rela-
tionship between interdependence and peace
may be divided into four categories, with
partly overlapping explanations for why trade
should promote peace.8
Trade costs
‘The natural effect of commerce is to bring
about peace. Two nations which trade to-
gether, render themselves reciprocally
dependent: if the one has an interest in buy-
ing the other has an interest in selling; and all
unions are based upon mutual needs’
(Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Book XX,
ch. II, 1748, quoted in Hirschman,
1945/1980: 10). 
This reciprocal dependence is usually
called interdependence. Interdependence,
according to Keohane & Nye (1977: 8-12), is
mutual dependence between states, meaning
that situations and events in one state affect
other states, and vice versa. Interdependence
may be cultural, technological, political, or
economic. The more costs and benefits the
relationship entails, the more interdependent
will the states be. 
Polachek (1980, also see Polachek, Robst
& Chang, 1999) investigates the impact of
economic costs on the incentives for conflic-
tive behavior in an expected utility model. In
the model in Hegre (2004), the fear of trade
losses reduces the incentives for the use of
force through its negative effect on produc-
tion and consumption. The model represents
the argument that the greater the mutual
dependence, the less the risk of war. It shows,
however, that the relationship must be sym-
metrical for the trade costs to affect the mili-
tary calculations of states. 
Territory and trade: Antithetical routes to
wealth
As Kant noted (see Section 1 above), liberals
assume that trade cannot exist side by side
with war. In The Great Illusion (1910; 1938),
Norman Angell depicts territorial expansion
and expansion through trade as contrasting
objectives for nations. Richard Rosecrance
(1986) argues that states are forced to make a
choice between expanding territory or
increasing trade as a basis for increasing
wealth, power, and welfare. ’To attack one’s
best customers is to undermine the commer-
cial faith and reciprocity in which exchange
takes place’ (Rosecrance, 1986:13–14).
Naturally, all states are concerned with terri-
tory, since nations are territorial organiza-
tions, and historically the ‘state with the
greatest land mass would have the largest
population, the greatest stock of natural
resources, and presumably as well the largest
wealth’ (1986: 6-7). 
Consequently, wars of conquest are means
to increasing territory, power and wealth. An
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8.  See McMillan (1997) and Schneider, Barbieri & Gleditsch (2003) for surveys of the literature on interdepend-
ence and conflict.alternative route is international trade. But
war and trade are antithetical routes to
wealth. This view is not a contradiction or
opposition to the classical ‘peace through
interdependence’ hypothesis, but an exten-
sion of it: 
While trading states try to improve their
position and their own domestic alloca-
tion of resources, they do so within a con-
text of accepted interdependence. They
recognize that the attempt to provide
every service and fulfill every function of
statehood on an independent and
autonomous basis is extremely inefficient,
and they prefer a situation which provides
for specialization and division of labor
among nations. One nation’s attempt to
improve its own access to products and
resources, therefore, does not conflict
with another state’s attempt to do the
same (p. 24).  
Changing their orientation from the mili-
tary-political world to the trading world does
not imply that trading states relieve them-
selves of security concerns. On the contrary,
economic interdependence has to be accom-
panied by military interdependence: ‘Trading
states will also normally form alliances as a
precaution against sudden intrusion by mili-
tary-political nations’ (p. 24). 
Merely aggregating one state’s set of
dyadic relationships does not imply that trad-
ing-state and military-political strategies are
mutually exclusive at the state level. It is con-
ceivable that states may trade peacefully with
a group of states, while using expansionist
strategies towards other. Rosecrance, how-
ever, argues that states tend to emphasize the
same strategy towards all states (1986:
29–30). Openness of a state decreases if it
engages in war or other external military
engagement: militarized conflict tends to dis-
rupt trade routes with all trading partners
(disruption through war actions, blockades,
and the closing down of important infra-
structure such as harbors). Conflicts may also
disrupt production for exports in the country
by diverting production from traded goods to
military goods. Conflicts – even merely the
expectation of them – may also discourage
investment from overseas because of the
heightened risk of losses resulting in lower
expected returns. Moreover, in order to
involve itself in an extensive bilateral trade
relationship with another state, the dyadic
liberal argument implies that a state needs to
trust that the other will behave peacefully
towards it. If a state is aggressive towards
third parties, this trust may be undermined.
In sum, if a state engages in a militarized
conflict with one other state, it risks that
trade with all other states is hurt. The
converse, then, also applies: As openness
increases, conflict decreases. That is, the rela-
tionship between trade and conflict is one
characterized by reciprocal effects, where
trade influences conflict and vice versa. 
The broadness of the political constituen-
cy also affects the alternative gains from a
trading-state strategy. For instance, both
democracies and autocracies have business
interests. Business interests generally don’t
like wars since they fear a cut-off of trade
with the enemy or with third parties. If busi-
ness interests have access to foreign policy,
they will influence the state in the direction
of trading-state strategies. In democracies, it
is more likely that business interests have
influence over foreign policy decisions. This
also implies that democracies should be more
likely to choose trading-state strategies. 
Trade as signal
Morrow (1999) and Gartzke, Li & Boehmer
(2001) base their argument on the bargaining
failure model of war. Just as political audience
30 Håvard Hegrecosts enables democratic leaders to credibly
signal their intention, market reactions may
function as signaling devices. Threatening to
use force is likely to induce domestic and
international economic actors to seek alter-
native markets or suppliers, or to prefer to
invest in other countries. Since high depend-
ence on international trade or foreign invest-
ment (or opportunities for domestic investors
to invest abroad) makes threats costly, such
states are less likely to be misrepresenting
their resolve. This reduces the danger of wars
due to the miscalculation of the opponent’s
intentions. 
Trade as a channel for contact and
understanding
Another mechanism between trade and peace
is that trade leads to cooperation on mutual
elimination of trade restrictions (Keohane,
1984: 75-78). Such cooperation may be for-
malized into an international regime.
According to liberal theorists, these regimes
dampen conflicts in themselves. They serve as
fora for negotiations, highlight the states’
common interests, broaden the involved
states’ repertoire of non-military means of
force through issue-linking, and ease the
inclusion of third-party mediators to con-
flicts. Thus, trade helps to put into practice
Kant’s second and third definitive articles of a
perpetual peace (cf. Section 1 above). 
Trade increases wealth
Weede (1995) argues that international trade
leads to peace through changes within the
states: Free trade increases the wealth of
countries. Greater wealth, in turn, tends to
reduce class conflict and to invite domestic
compromises, and consequently leads to
democracy. Democracies, in turn, do not
wage war with each other, according to the
democratic peace thesis. This forms a strong
causal chain, where trade primarily affects the
monadic (nation) level, but reinforces a
dyadic effect through wealth and democracy.
This causal chain is discussed at more length
below. 
Limitations to the trade-and-conflict
relationship
Realists stress the dominance of security
issues over economic issues. Not seeing this,
they claim, is to ignore the fact that the inter-
national system is anarchical. As a logical
consequence, then, the most important
realist counter-arguments question the direc-
tion of causation in the liberal reasoning.
Anticipating the costs of broken trade ties in
wartime, a state will have an incentive to
limit its trade with other states if it perceives
the probability of war with them in the near
future to be high. This is a classic realistic
argument, found in Waltz (1979) and
perhaps most explicitly in Copeland (1996). 
Others argue that states that see each
other as potential enemies avoid entering into
trade relationships (cf. Gowa & Mansfield,
1993; Pollins, 1989b). Empirically, several
studies indicate that the causation runs in
both directions in dyadic relationships (Kim,
1998; Reuveny & Kang, 1996; 1998): To the
extent that two states are interacting, the
interaction is either characterized by peaceful
trade or by a hostile and possibly militarized
no-trade relationship. Oneal, Russett &
Berbaum (2003), however, find that trade
reduces conflict even when controlling for
the influence of past conflict. 
Realists also argue that interdependence is
a double-edged sword. If a country is
dependent on resources in another country, it
may be tempted to secure access to the
resources by occupying the other country,
thereby unilaterally solving its ‘dependency
problem’ (Copeland, 1996: 10; Liberman,
1996: 148; Mearsheimer, 1990: 45;
Skaperdas & Syropoulos, 1996; Dorussen &
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trade may also create losses beyond the loss of
the gains from trade. The economy has to
readjust, it will lose productivity, and social
problems may emerge from the ensuing
unemployment. All in all, the country may
be worse off than if the trade ties never had
existed (see also Buzan, 1984: 620-621;
Hirschman, 1945/1980: 26-29). This
argument is especially valid if the trade
relation is asymmetrical. 
Another realist objection is that a liberal
zone of peace requires a hegemon to blossom.
According to hegemonic stability theory (see
Keohane, 1984), order in world politics is
typically created by a single dominant power
– a hegemon. Without this hegemon, the
order will collapse. The liberal peace requires
adhesion to the rules of a liberal internation-
al economic power. The only way this can be
enforced, the argument goes, is through an
economically and militarily superior power.
Military power is crucial to the hegemonic
stability theory, since economic issues may
become military-security issues if they are
crucial enough to basic national interests. ‘A
hegemonic power must possess enough
military power to protect the international
political economy it dominates from incur-
sion by hostile adversaries’ (Keohane, 1984:
39). In fact, the hegemonic stability theory is
the systemic variant of the argument in the
previous section. Just as bilateral trade
requires the expectation of stable, peaceful
relations between the two states, a liberal
economy requires a stable, regulated system –
a liberal international regime, as it is often
labeled (Keohane, 1984: 49ff.) Just as domes-
tic economic activity will be restrained if
private property rights are not protected by
the state, economic activity between
countries will be difficult if there is no hege-
mon with economic and military power to
enforce the rules. A liberal economy is
dependent on, as a pre-existing condition,
the peace and stability it is supposed to
explain (Buzan 1984: 607). 
Related to this is the argument that the
liberal peace is an artifact of the Cold War.
The Western states have had high levels of
trade and an unprecedented period of peace
in the 50 years following World War II, but
this cannot be seen independently of the fact
that the same states were on the same side in
the global contest with the Soviet Union
(Farber & Gowa, 1995). 
Finally, the trade and interstate conflict
component of the liberal peace does not have
a domestic counterpart as does the demo-
cratic peace. There seems to be no relation-
ship between the extent to which countries
trade and their risks of internal conflict, apart
from the indirect effect through the fact 
that trade promotes economic growth and
development (Hegre, Gleditsch & Gissinger,
2003; Elbadawi & Hegre, 2004). 
The Role of Economic Development
This section summarizes the literature on the
relationship between development and
democracy, shows that several scholars have
argued that development also affects the
incentives for warfare, and continues to make
the argument that socioeconomic develop-
ment profoundly affects the liberal peace.
Arguably, development is a precondition for
the emergence of peaceful liberal zones. 
Development and democracy
Figure 1 shows how the proportion of the
world’s countries that are democratic have
changed over time. A country is coded as
democratic if it scores at least 0.5 on an
indicator that ranges from 0 (completely
autocratic) to 1 (fully democratic). The
indicator is the average of three sub-indica-
tors that evaluate the democraticness of the
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ment process for the executive, the con-
straints on the executive, and the extent to
which the population of the country is
allowed to participate in elections. 
The increase in the number of demo-
cracies coincides with the spread of industria-
lization. This link from development to
democracy is a classic finding in moderniza-
tion theory – ‘the more well-to-do a nation,
the greater the chances it will sustain
democracy’ (Lipset, 1959: 75). These views
have found support in several recent empiri-
cal studies (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994;
Barro, 1996; Londregan and Poole, 1996;
Vanhanen, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000;
Gates et al., 2003ab, Boix 2003). 
Lipset (1959) argues that higher income
and better education for ‘the lower strata’
would lead to a more compromise-oriented
view of politics. Rich countries also have
greater surpluses to distribute; this permits
modernization through education, occupa-
tional mobility, free flow of information, and
organizational experience. Taken together,
these factors encourage adaptability and
compromise, tolerance, and moderation.
Increased access to material assets and thus
also to political resources, together with
greater institutional diversity, act as precondi-
tions for stable democracy. 
Higher average income is also associated
with a more diversified economy with more
alternative economic opportunities. This is
important for the emergence or stability of
democracy, according to Lipset (1959:84): ‘If
loss of office is seen as meaning serious loss
for major power groups, then they will be
readier to resort to more drastic measures in
seeking to retain or secure office’. Moreover,
wealth is associated with the presence of non-
governmental organizations and institutions
‘which can act as sources of countervailing
power, and recruiters of participants in the
political process’ (Lipset, 1959:84). 
Dahl (1989:251ff.) argues that a ‘modern
dynamic pluralist society’ (abbreviated
MDP) is particularly favorable for the estab-
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.lishment and stability of democracy, partly
because of the attitudes and beliefs such soci-
eties foster, and partly because such society
disperses power away from any single center
toward a variety of individuals, groups, asso-
ciations, and organizations: 
What is crucial about an MDP society is
that on the one hand it inhibits the con-
centration of power in any single unified
set of actors, and on the other it disperses
power among a number of relatively inde-
pendent actors. Because of their power
and autonomy, the actors can resist
unilateral domination, compete with one
another for advantages, engage in conflict
and bargaining, and pursue independent
actions on their own. Characteristic of an
MDP society is a dispersion of political
resources, such as money, knowledge,
status, and access to organizations; of
strategic locations, particularly in eco-
nomic, scientific, educational, and cultur-
al affairs; and of bargaining positions,
both overt and latent, in economic affairs,
science, communications, education, and
elsewhere. (Dahl, 1989; 252)  
In addition to lacking the political resources
mentioned here, poor people don’t have the
surplus needed to be politically active, and
are more risk-averse because of their margin-
al income. They are more vulnerable to
intimidation because a larger share of their
property can be physically destroyed. 
The link between development and
democracy has also been explained in terms
of education. Lipset (1959) notes that ‘educa-
tion presumably broadens men’s outlooks,
enables them to understand the need for
norms of tolerance, restraining them from
adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines,
and increases their capacity to make rational
electoral choices’ (p. 79). In addition to
Lipset’s argument for education’s beneficial
effect on these democratic values, a higher
median education level may also stabilize
democracies through making it harder for
elites to exploit the political system for their
own benefit: education allows a population
to effectively monitor politicians’ actions. To
take one example: a free press is vital to a
functioning democracy, but is not likely to
make much of a difference if the vast majori-
ty of the population is illiterate. This poten-
tial exploitation is likely to undermine and
delegitimize the democratic system in the
long run, as the electorate slowly realizes how
it is misused. 
A high average level of education is also
important for building an efficient bureau-
cracy, another vital component of a well-
functioning democracy. 
Dahl’s argument quoted above applies
both to income and education. It is hard to
distinguish these variables: Income, educa-
tion and literacy are typically correlated, and
in many of the arguments discussed above it
is hard to distinguish between the effects of
education and those of income. 
The third aspect of development – the
structure of the economy – is also related to
the likelihood that a country democratizes or
remains either autocratic or democratic. Ross
(2001) shows empirically that resource
wealth is negatively correlated with the level
of democracy. He puts forward three causal
mechanisms that may explain this corre-
lation: 
The first he terms the ‘rentier effect’ (pp.
333–35): Autocratic governments use the
revenues from the abundant resources to
relieve social pressures that might otherwise
lead to demands for greater accountability
and representation, either through low taxes
or no taxes at all, or use parts of the income
for spending on patronage, or uses the rent-
based largesse to prevent the formation of
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state, either deliberately or simply through
the relative insignificance of private econom-
ic actors. The second is called the ‘repression
effect’ (pp. 335–36): The resource wealth
allows the governments to spend more on
internal security, which allows them to effec-
tively repress the opposition.
9 The third
mechanism is referred to as the ‘moderniza-
tion effect’ (pp. 336–): In line with the
discussion above, Ross notes that economic
development is associated with high levels of
education, occupational specialization, and
urbanization. Resource-led growth, however,
may not lead to higher education levels and
occupational specialization, and hence fails to
increase the probability of democratization. 
Ross’ argument predicts that resource-rich
autocracies tend to remain stably autocratic,
but also implies that resource-rich democra-
cies are relatively unstable. This is the focus of
Wantchekon (2000), who argues that
destabilization often happens to resource-rich
democracies. If the ability of the state to
enforce the law is weak, incumbent govern-
ments have an informational advantage over
the availability of rents to distribute to voters,
and/or discretionary power to distribute
these rents. To counter an incumbent who
spends government resources in ways that
maximizes his/hers electoral gains, the oppo-
sition will have an incentive to turn to illegal
means such as inciting riots or staging coups
to counter the incumbency advantage. This
mechanism is stronger the more rents there
are to distribute. Both Ross (2001) and
Wantchekon (2000) report results from
cross-sectional statistical studies that confirm
that there is a negative correlation between
democracy and mineral resource dependence. 
It is also possible to phrase this mecha-
nism in terms of Dahl’s diffusion of power:
The income from natural resources as oil and
minerals typically employ very few people
and generate enormous taxes. In a country
where a large proportion of the income stems
from such sources, power is disproportional-
ly concentrated in the state and the few
companies and the skilled labor that do the
actual extraction. The lack of diffusion of
power creates an unfavorable condition for
democracy. 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and
Przeworski et al. (2000: 88) point out that
the relationship between democracy and
development may come about in two ways:
either because democracies ‘may be more
likely to emerge as countries develop eco-
nomically, or, having been established for
whatever reasons, democracies may be more
likely to survive in developed countries.’
Modernization theory implies the former
process – increases in literacy, income, etc.
creates a ‘pressure’ for democratization, or
‘favorable conditions’ for successful demo-
cratic transitions (Dahl, 1989:239ff.).
Przeworski et al. (2000) present results sup-
porting the second of these mechanisms only. 
Boix & Stokes (2002) challenge these
findings, and show that when reanalyzing
Przeworski et al.’s models for a longer time-
frame transitions to democracy really
becomes more likely when average income
rises. In a formalization of Przeworski &
Limongi’s intuitive explanation, they also
challenge the theoretical rationale for their
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democratization.findings: If, as Przeworski & Limongi
assume, a lower marginal utility of consump-
tion at higher levels of consumption reduces
the gain from winning the struggle for dicta-
torship, income growth both stabilizes
democracy and increases the ruling factions’
incentives to democratize. Boix (2003)
explains this relationship in terms of asset
specificity, or the mobility of capital: The
mobility of capital places an upper threshold
on the tax rate the median voter in a democ-
racy will choose. With a lower expected tax,
the wealthy are less likely to block democracy.
Since the process of economic development is
a story of a shift to more mobile capital, this
explains the empirical regularity. Their model
is also consistent with the observation that
primary commodity-dependent countries are
less likely to become and remain democratic,
since primary commodities are highly
country-specific assets. 
Development and civil war
As discussed above, Collier (2000), Collier &
Hoeffler (2004), Collier et al. (2003), and
Fearon & Laitin (2003) argue that the oppor-
tunities for organizing a rebel army is more
important to explain the occurrence of civil
war than the motivations people might have
for rebellion. Such opportunities are typically
present in countries with low income and
education levels. Empirically, the link from
aspects of development directly to domestic
peace is one of the most robust findings in
recent large-N studies on the determinants of
civil war. The discussion of these findings can
also be decomposed into the three aspects of
development discussed here. 
Opportunity costs
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) ‘predation
theory’ assumes that there will always be
someone who has sufficient grievances to be
willing to start a rebellion against the govern-
ment. Hence, whatever the motivation, the
rebellion can only be carried out if it is finan-
cially viable. Average income affects the
viability through opportunity costs: The
recruits of the rebel groups must be paid, and
their cost is likely to be lower the lower their
alternative income is. Hence, everything else
equal, it is easier to maintain a rebellion in
countries or regions with low average income
than in richer regions. 
Collier & Hoeffler support their argu-
ment by estimating a statistical model of the
determinants of civil war using three proxies
for alternative economic opportunities for
potential recruits: GDP per capita, male
secondary school enrollment, and the growth
of the economy. GDP per capita captures the
average income in the country, school enroll-
ment is an alternative occupation to rebellion
in the short run and promises improved
income in the long run, and the growth rate
indicates the amount of new income oppor-
tunities. 
Government military capabilities
Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and
Fearon and Laitin (2003) note that per capi-
ta income is also related to governments’
military capabilities. Rich countries with a
solid tax base are more able to deter rebellion
than poor countries, everything else being
equal. Fearon & Laitin further note that a
high per capita income is associated with
high financial, administrative, and police
capabilities, a terrain more ‘disciplined’ by
roads and agriculture (p. 10), and a higher
level of penetration by central administra-
tion. All this favors the state’s ability to
counter insurgencies, and thus reduces the
probability of civil war.10
Although Collier & Hoeffler use a meas-
ure of education levels – secondary schooling
– as an independent variable in their analysis,
they interpret it more as a proxy of oppor-
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indicator of a direct effect of education. One
possible way that education might have a
direct effect on the risk of armed conflict is to
extend Dahl’s argument that education
increases the power resources that lies in the
citizens themselves: In most civil wars, the
civil population suffers. Ordinary citizens do
not want rebel movements to operate in their
neighborhood. Rebel groups typically are
dependent on the civil population for food
and other resources, and use their military
power to obtain this. In many civil wars,
citizens organize to resist this predation.
However, limiting the activity of rebel move-
ments involves a collective action problem
(Fearon & Laitin, 1999). In this sense, resist-
ance of rebel groups is analogous to the
process of establishing democracy (limiting
the power of the incumbent king or sover-
eign), which also involves a collective action
problem (Weingast, 1997). Hence, it is pos-
sible that the structural changes/mechanisms
that enables citizens to overcome their collec-
tive action problem with respect to limiting
the sovereign (e.g. literacy, efficient means of
communications, free time, sources of
income that are independent of the state,
property that is secure from physical destruc-
tion) are the same (or rather, related to) as
those that enable them to overcome the col-
lective action problem with respect to rebel
movements. Education and literacy, then,
may affect the risk of civil war directly. A
high per-capita income is also likely to work
in this way. 
Structure of the economy
In Collier & Hoeffler (2004), the structure of
the economy also affects the income side of
the rebel groups’ finances. They argue that
civil war is particularly likely in countries that
have certain types of natural resource abun-
dance, since control over such resources pro-
vides an attractive source of income for the
rebel organization. This is particularly true
for commodities that are located in territories
a rebel group can easily defend, such as
resources that are located far from the capital,
e.g. tropical timber in remote regions of the
country (Le Billon, 2001:569ff). The
resources must also be extractable without
much physical investment, since the extrac-
tion often takes place in a war zone, and
preferably be easy to bring to international
markets. Alluvial diamonds is an example of
a commodity that satisfies the two last
requirements. Natural resource dependence
or abundance is also found to hamper growth
(Sachs & Warner, 1995; Auty, 2001), which
again is associated with conflict (de Soysa,
2000, Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). 
Other types of natural resources tend to
favor the government, on the other hand. Oil
extraction and mining (including kimberlite
diamonds), for instance, is seldom controlled
by rebel groups because of the large invest-
ment typically required. Moreover, when
large oil revenues or loans based on expected
revenues start flowing into the state budgets,
governments are often able to invest in mili-
tary capabilities that will effectively deter any
armed insurrection (cf. Ross, 2001).
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10. The argument is reminiscent of the discussion of realism above. Hobbes’ Leviathan, a prime reference for real-
ist international relations scholars, specifically argued for concentrating power in a sovereign (the Leviathan) in
order to avoid the disadvantages of domestic anarchy.
11. In countries that have an abundance of this type of resources, government becomes the prize over which fight-
ing takes place. This type of contest is modeled in Skaperdas & Syropoulos (1996) and Skaperdas (2002): They
show how the availability of rent increases the intensity of conflict. They also note how that the existence of
‘secure resources’ – resources that cannot be appropriated – is important, and that the amount of waste or destruc-
tion in conflict reduces intensity of conflict.Collier et al. (2003), Fearon & Laitin
(2003), and Hegre et al. (2001) show how
important per-capita income – which is
closely related to the structural factors
discussed here – is for reducing the risk of
internal conflict. Moreover, Hegre (2000)
shows that similar processes apply in interna-
tional relations: Rosecrance’s (1986) descrip-
tion of how development alters the incentives
for choosing between a trading-states or a
military-political strategy. In relations
between developed countries, it is hard to
make conquered territories profitable.
Hence, trade is a relatively more attractive
way to gain access to resources. This is
analogous to the incentives for predation
discussed in the internal war literature. The
alternative for elites to the ‘military-political
strategy’ – predation – is to agree with each
other to secure property rights and to use the
organizational capabilities they possess to
make the property they control maximally
profitable, just as international trade does. 
Development and the democratic peace
In addition to altering states’ choice between
Rosecrance’s two strategies in itself, the
democratic peace hypothesis (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 1999; Doyle, 1986; Maoz &
Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993) may imply that
the nature of the political regime alters how
development affects this choice. 
The democratic peace may also require
that the states are developed: Democracy and
development reinforce each others’ tenden-
cies to favor trading-state strategies. Citizens
of poor countries may have more to gain
from territorial expansion since the economy
is land-based, implying that the democratic
peace is less valid for poor countries than for
rich ones. Conversely, extensive illiteracy,
poor communications, and weak political
institutions in under-developed countries
constrain citizens’ ability to use democratic
institutions to restrict rulers. Such ideas are
important for the argument that developed
countries are more likely to sustain demo-
cracy (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Lipset,
1959). 
Mansfield & Snyder (1995; 1996; 2002)
argue that democratization and lack of
democratic consolidation at the very least
diminishes the extent to which democracy
constrains states’ military behavior. Since
democracies in low- and middle-income
countries are markedly more unstable than
high-income countries (Przeworski et al.,
2000; Gates et al.. 2003ab), this implies that
the democratic peace should be strongest for
high-income countries. 
Finally, Mousseau (2000: 479) argues that
it is the intensity in market transactions in
developed society that leads to democratic
consolidation, since ‘if individuals in devel-
oped market economies tend to share the
social and political values of exchange-based
cooperation, individual choice and free will,
negotiation and compromise, universal
equity among individuals, and universal trust
in the sanctity of contract, then individuals in
developed market economies tend to share of
democratic values. The same market norms
are incompatible with using military force in
foreign affairs (pp. 480–481). Hence,
democracies funded on these norms will
avoid arbitrarily using force towards other
states sharing these norms. However, since
market transactions are more intense in
developed democracies, the democratic peace
should be stronger the more developed the
two states in the dyad are. 
Hegre (2000), Mousseau (2000), and
Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal (2003) show
empirically that the democratic peace is
stronger in developed dyads than in dyads
with at least one non-developed state. 
38 Håvard HegreDevelopment, trade, and interstate war
Rosecrance (1986) argues that commerce is
gradually replacing con-quest as a means of
advancing the national interest. Well into the
twentieth century, he holds, the international
system was founded on the assumption that
land was the major factor in both production
and power. This ‘obsession with land’ was the
major cause of war since states could improve
their position by building empires or invad-
ing other nations to seize territory (1996:
48). During the twentieth century, however,
mobile factors of production – capital and
labor – are surpassing land in importance for
productive strength. This means a relative
decline in the value of land. This develop-
ment coincides with increasing nationalist
resistance, which increases the cost of holding
an occupied territory and of extracting
resources from this. This has an impact of the
frequency of war, Rosecrance argues, since
‘labor, capital, and information is mobile and
cannot be definitely seized’ (1996: 48). 
This change is partly a systemic change –
technological changes reducing transaction
costs and the increase in nationalist resistance
has gradually tipped the system-wide balance
in favor of the ‘trading world’ at the expense
of the ‘military-political world’. However,
economic and technological development
within the individual states also change the
individual orientation of the states: Referring
to recent conflicts involving Bosnia, Iraq,
India, and Pakistan, Rosecrance states that
‘[l]ess developed countries, still producing
goods that are derived from land, continue to
covet territory. In economies where capital,
labor, and information are mobile and have
risen to predominance, no land fetish
remains’ (1996p. 46). Industrialization, then,
induces states to become more dependent on
trade and less inclined to initiate wars over
territorial issues. Developed states continue
to be prepared to defend their existing
borders, but regard territorial expansion as to
costly to pay. If Rosecrance is right, we
should expect that developed states trade
more and engage less in war. This hypothesis
is explored and supported empirically in
Hegre (2000). 
Development is central for Rosecrance’s
argument in two respects. Firstly, the trading-
state strategy is based on improving (or devel-
oping) the utilization of resources within the
existing territory in order to increase wealth
and power. The military-political strategy
attempts to achieve growth through in-
creasing the amount of resources available
through expanding the territory, without
improving the use of the resources. In this
sense, development is an objective of the
trading-state strategy, but not necessarily of
the military-political strategy. 
Secondly, development alters the incen-
tives for choosing between the two strategies.
Industrialization increases the demands for
natural resources, rendering the trading
state/military-political dilemma more acute.
With economic expansion, the demand for
resources and labor increases. Industrializa-
tion in general leads to a situation where the
domestic supply of resources and labor
becomes too narrow. This argument is central
for Choucri & North (1975; 1989), who see
industrializing to increase a state’s ‘lateral
pressure’ – the extension of a country’s
behavior and interests outside its territorial
boundaries. Lateral pressure will manifest
itself both in the form of trade or territorial
expansion. Growth through development
may also lead to power transitions that in
turn lead to conflict (Organski & Kugler,
1980). 
It is important, however, to distinguish
between the process of industrializing and the
status of being industrialized, to distinguish
between economic growth and economic
structure. Lateral pressure theory and power
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when a country moves from being non-
industrialized to industrialized, but not after
the industrialization is completed and the
power and resource-access balances are
reestablished. Lateral pressure theory, how-
ever, do suggest that the access to resources is
relatively more important for developed,
highly diversified economies than for less
diversified economies. Modern trade theory
increasingly focuses on economies of scale in
accounting for the volume of trade, irrespec-
tive of comparative advantage (Ethier, 1995:
47–68). This access to resources can either be
secured through conquest or through com-
merce. Industrialization may spur states to
secure this access through military means
(Liberman, 1993). Moreover, industrializa-
tion increases the state’s interaction capacity.
This indicates that industrialization in a
country may lead to either more trade or
more war. 
Other aspects of industrialization imply
that industrialization decreases the likelihood
of conflict. Industrialization tends to increase
the costs of fighting wars on one’s own
territory: Potential aggressors will be aware
that sophisticated factories and elaborate
infrastructure take more time to reconstruct
if damaged than do agricultural fields.
Industrialization, then, should constrain
leaders from initiating wars that risk being
fought on own territory. Moreover, the
technologically advanced weapons possessed
by industrialized countries are very destruc-
tive. Aggressors, then, should be reluctant to
attack such targets, as the costs of retaliation
may be unbearably high. 
Highly diversified economies are depend-
ent on a wide range of imported goods and
markets. The more diversified its economy,
the less likely it is that a state may secure
access to a significant portion of its needs
through the occupation of a single state.
Industrialization and development is associ-
ated with increasing demand for resources
and labor only up to a certain point. Beyond
that point, further development is primarily
dependent on access to capital, technology,
and highly specialized knowledge. Access to
these factors is much harder to gain through
conquest than is the case for natural resources
and labor. This implies that to the extent that
industrialization really increases the amount
of warfare through the mechanisms of lateral
pressure, this is valid only up to a certain
point. 
Increased dependence on capital – foreign
or domestic – also affects the expected costs
of warfare. To the extent that foreign
investors avoid engagements in countries that
are likely to get involved in a war, this adds to
the economic costs of war for industrialized
countries. Domestic capital is also likely to
flee the country if war breaks out. Less
capital-intensive economies are less con-
strained by these considerations (Gartzke, Li,
& Boehmer, 2001). All in all, the relative
utility of conquest should decrease when the
economy becomes less dependent on land
and natural resources, and more dependent
on capital and knowledge. 
In addition, as the level of development
increases, the diversity of materials used, and
even the sheer magnitude of the quantities
consumed and the size of the markets
needed, weighs against a military strategy
(Brooks, 1999). The increased diversity of
inputs increases the amount of new territory
needed for self-sufficiency. Development may
provide the motive and means for a state to
seize a particular territory from another by
force, but it also increases its dependence on
third parties. War hampers trade with third
parties either because of political reactions or
because the heightened risk resulting from
conflict increases the price of traded goods.
Since world conquest is an unrealistic
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imposed on developed states by their
increased trade with a great number of other
nations is apt to outweigh the prospect of
gaining control over one particular territory.
Supportive of this view, Hegre (2000)
concludes that the pacifying impact of trade
may be conditional to higher levels of devel-
opment. 
Conclusion: The Limits of the
Liberal Peace
The discussion above shows how the three
components of the liberal peace theory share
some important fundamental assumptions: A
country or a region will benefit from a 
liberal peace if individual citizens are given
political rights so that they can influence the
country’s foreign policy, and/or if individual
citizens, and firms are allowed to trade freely
irrespective of national borders. 
The discussion also shows that the liberal
peace is most likely to be observed in circum-
stances where it is hard to take physical
control over assets or over individuals.
Democracy is most likely to emerge where
individuals are in a position to engage in
political debate, or to vote with their feet if
not allowed to cast a ballot, and in societies
where those in power are economically
dependent on the skills and cooperation of
large segments of the society. Civil wars are
most likely in countries where narrow groups
have an incentive to organize armies to gain
control over assets they can make profits out
of. In order to be able to capture them, these
assets must be capturable and preferably
bound to a particular territory, and the
incumbent government must be too weak to
defend them. In order to be profitable, they
must be either extractable without access to
much capital, or the rebel group must gain
control over the entire state. The same factors
dictate when states have incentives to con-
quer foreign territories. 
Socioeconomic development crucially
alters these circumstances. Increased literacy
enables citizens to become informed and
participate in the political process. Large
numbers of educated citizens may more 
easily threaten to gain political concessions
through strikes or threats of migration. Poor
people are typically easy to intimidate since
small negative changes to their income or
destruction of property can have fatal conse-
quences. 
Development is also a transition from
production of territory-specific, physical
assets such as natural resources or agricultur-
al commodities, to production assets that
require human and financial capital. Such
assets are not easily appropriable. 
This has empirical implications for the
liberal peace: The incentives for important
components of the liberal peace: democrati-
zation, trade, and warfare all depend on the
security and distribution of resources.
Financial capital and human skills are intrin-
sically more secure factors than assets specific
to a particular piece of land. Human skills are
also more equally distributed than any other
factors. Hence, the transition from an econo-
my primarily based on land to one based on
capital should make the liberal peace more
feasible. 
More importantly, all aspects of the liber-
al peace are clearly strongest for developed
countries and pairs of countries. Rich, indus-
trialized democracies clearly are better at
maintaining a civil peace than poor, primary-
commodity-dependent ones  Both trade and
democracy are more effective in reducing the
risk of interstate war in relations between rich
or industrialized countries. Similarly, the
democratic peace seems to be considerably
stronger among high-income countries than
among low-income countries .The argument
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economic development is supported in sever-
al systematic empirical studies, as reviewed
above. 
I suggest that there are several reasons for
this. First, rich democracies are more con-
solidated and stable than poor ones (or are
expected to soon become consolidated). This
is largely due to the fact that the political
stakes are relatively low in rich countries
where elites have more attractive alternative
opportunities to earn income – there is rela-
tively more to gain from securing property
rights in order to establish capital-intensive
production than to seek to physically control
a part of the economy. At the same time,
citizens are well-educated and have an
economic surplus to participate actively in
the democratic process, and may hence use
the democratic political system to effectively
constrain elite behavior. Democracies in poor
states with limited resources may also find it
difficult to stave off attacks from marginal
groups that may benefit from challenging the
government militarily. 
The reasons for the interstate components
of the liberal peace are related to why
development strengthens the domestic
democratic peace: in relations between de-
veloped countries, there is relatively little to
gain from attempting conquest of foreign
territories – the territories are to a large extent
valuable only as long as the citizens volun-
tarily agree to be productive, and as long as
domestic and international investors prefer to
invest there and not in other countries. For
non-industrialized countries, conquest may
solve countries’ dependence on access to a
wide range of resources and large markets.
This, however, may also be obtained through
trade – rich countries are more likely to pur-
sue trading-state strategies than military-
political strategies. For all pairs of countries,
the extent of the trade flow also tells us some-
thing about how much a country would gain
from controlling the economy of the other
country. If war is generally attractive to states,
they will tend to go to war with their main
trading partners. Hence, trade is ineffective
in reducing conflict between non-developed
countries. If war is generally non-attractive,
trade is effective in reducing conflict. 
The explanations for why the democratic
peace may be limited to developed countries
are related to the ones summarized above: If
low-income democracies are generally un-
stable, and citizens are unable to effectively
constrain the elites, none of the suggested
mechanisms of the democratic peace are like-
ly to be very effective when such countries are
involved. Likewise, if territorial expansion
through conquest is generally attractive to a
country, it may also be attractive to the
citizens. 
References
Angell, Norman, 1910. The Great Illusion. A Study of
the Relationship of Military Power in Nations to
Their Economic and Social Advantage. London:
Heinemann. 
Angell, Norman, 1938. The Great Illusion – Now .
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Auty, Richard, 2001. Resource Abundance and Economic
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Banks, A. S., & R. B. Textor, 1963. A Cross-Polity
Survey. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Barbieri, Katherine, 1996a. ‘Economic Inter-
dependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of
Interstate Conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research
33(1): 29-49. 
Barbieri, Katherine, 1996b. ‘Explaining Discrepant
Findings in the Trade-Conflict Literature’, Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association, San Diego, CA,
April 16-21. 
Barbieri, Katherine, 2002. The Liberal Illusion. Does
Trade Promote Peace? Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press. 
Beck, Nathaniel; Jonathan N. Katz & Richard Tucker,
1998. ‘Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-
Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent
Variable’,  American Journal of Political Science
42 Håvard Hegre42(4): 1260–1288. 
Benoit, Kenneth, 1996. ‘Democracies Really are more
Pacific (in General): Reexamining Regime Type
and War Involvement’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 40(4): 636-657. 
Boix, Carles , 2003. Democracy and Redistribution.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boix, Carles & Susan Stokes, 2002. ‘Endogenous
Democratization’, Ms. The University of Chicago,
September 19. URL:
http://home.uchicago.edu/cboix/Papers.html. 
Boswell, Terry & William J. Dixon, 1990.
‘Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National
Analysis’,  American Sociological Review
55(3):540–559. 
Bremer, Stuart, 1992. ‘Dangerous Dyads.: Conditions
Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War,
1816–1965’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2):
309–41. 
Brooks, Stephen G, 1999. ‘The Globalization of
Production and the Changing Benefits of
Conquest’,  Journal of Conflict Resolution 43:
646–670. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; James D. Morrow,
Randolph M. Siverson & Alastair Smith, 1999. ‘An
Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace’,
American Political Science Review 93(December):
791-807. 
Burkhart, Ross E. & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, 1994.
‘Comparative Democracy: The Economic
Development Thesis’, American Political Science
Review 88(4): 903–910. 
Buzan, Barry, 1984. ‘Economic Structure and
International Security: The Limits of the Liberal
Case’, International Organization 38(4): 597-624. 
Chan, Steve, 1984. ‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... Are
the Freer Countries more Pacific?’, Journal of
Conflict Resolution 28(4): 617-648. 
Choucri, Nazli & Robert C. North, 1975. Nations in
Conflict: National Growth and International
Violence. San Fransisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and
Company. 
Choucri, Nazli & Robert C. North, 1989. ‘Lateral
Pressure in International Relations: Concept and
Theory’ , in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of
War Studies. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University
Press. 
Christiansen, Lene Siljeholm, 2004. Military
Interventions and Democratization. Draft for
Cand.polit. Thesis, Norwegian University of
Technology and Sciences, February. 
Christiansen, Lene Siljeholm, Nils Petter Gleditsch &
Håvard Hegre, 2004. ‘Democratic Jihad?’, paper
under preparation for presentation to the annual
convention of the International Studies
Association, Montreal, March. 
Collier, Paul, 2000. ‘Doing Well Out of War: An
Economic Perspective’, in Mats Berdal & David M.
Malone, eds, Greed & Grievance: Economic
Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
(91–111). 
Collier, Paul; Lani Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke
Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol & Nicholas
Sambanis, 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil
War and Development Policy. World Bank Policy
Research Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press
and Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. ‘Greed and
Grievance in Civil War’ Oxford Economic Papers
56(4):563-595. 
Copeland, Dale C., 1996. ‘Economic Interdependence
and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations’,
International Security 20(4): 5-41. 
Dahl, Robert A., 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Davies, James C., 1962. ‘Toward a Theory of
Revolution’,  American Sociological Review
27(1):5–19. 
Dorussen, Han & Håvard Hegre, 2003. ‘Extending the
Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict’, in
Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, & Nils Petter
Gleditsch, eds., Globalization and Armed Conflict.
Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Doyle, Michael W., 1983a. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs, part 1. Philosophy & Public Affairs
12: 205-235 
Doyle, Michael W., 1983b. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs, part 2. Philosophy & Public Affairs
12: 323-353. 
Doyle, Michael W., 1986. ‘Liberalism and World
Politics’,  American Political Science Review 80(4):
1151-1169. 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim & Håvard Hegre, 2004.
‘Globalization, Economic Shocks, and Armed
Conflict’, Paper presented to the ‘Globalization,
Territoriality and Conflict’ conference, University
of California, San Diego, January 16–18. URL:
http://folk.uio.no/hahegre/papers. 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim & Nicholas Sambanis, 2002. ‘How
Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence
of Civil War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution
46(3):307–334. 
Ellingsen, Tanja, 2000. ‘Colorful Community or
Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and
Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold
War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44:2(228–49). 
Ethier, Wilfred J., 1995. Modern International
Economics. New York & London: Norton. 
Farber, Henry S. & Joanne Gowa, 1995. ‘Polities and
Peace’, International Security 20(2): 123-146. 
Fearon, James D., 1994. ‘Domestic Political Audiences
and the Escalation of International Disputes’,
American Political Science Review 88(3): 577-592. 
Fearon, James D., 1995. ‘Rationalist Explanations for
Development and the liberal peace 43War’, International Organization 49(3): 379–414. 
Fearon, James D. & David D. Laitin, 1999. ‘Weak
States, Rough Terrain, and Large-scale Ethnic
Violence’, Paper presented at the 1999 Annual
Meetings of the American Political Science
Association, Atlanta, GA, September. 
Fearon, James D. & David Laitin, 2003. ‘Ethnicity,
Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political
Science Review 97(1): 75-90. 
Gartzke, Erik, 1999. ‘War Is In the Error Term’,
International Organization 53 (3): 567-. 
Gartzke, Erik; Quan Li & Charles Boehmer, 2001.
‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence
and International Conflict’, International
Organization 55(2):391–438. 
Gartzke, Erik & Quan Li, 2003. ‘War, Peace, and the
Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of
Economic Globalization’, International Studies
Quarterly 47(4): 561–586. 
Gates, Scott, 2002. ‘Recruitment and Allegiance: The
Microfoundations of Rebellion’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46(1): 111—130. 
Gates, Scott; Håvard Hegre, Mark Jones & Håvard
Strand, 2003a. ‘Institutional Inconsistency and
Polity Duration’, typescript, PRIO. URL:
http://folk.uio.no/hahegre/Papers/Institutions.pdf. 
Gates, Scott; Håvard Hegre, Mark Jones & Håvard
Strand, 2003b. ‘Democratic Waves? War, New
States, and Global Patterns of Democracy,
1800–2000. Paper presented at the University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, March. 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Håvard Hegre, 1997. ‘Peace
and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis’, Journal
of Conflict Resolution 41(2): 283-310. 
Gowa, Joanne & Edward D. Mansfield, 1993. ‘Power
Politics and International Trade’, American Political
Science Review 87(2): 408-420. 
Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. ‘Realist Theory and the
Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis
with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model’,
Journal of Politics 50(4): 600-624. 
Gurr, Ted Robert, 1970 Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. 
Hegre, Håvard, 2000. ‘Development and the Liberal
Peace: What does it Take to Be a Trading State?’,
Journal of Peace Research 37(1): 5–30. 
Hegre, Håvard, 2003. ‘Disentangling Democracy,
Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict’,
presented at the 44th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association (ISA), Portland,
OR, 25 February–1 March. 
Hegre, Håvard, 2004. ‘Size Asymmetry, Trade, and
Militarized Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution
48(3): 403-429. 
Hegre, Håvard; Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates & Nils
Petter Gleditsch, 2001. ‘Toward a Democratic
Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and
Civil War, 1816-1992’, American Political Science
Review 95(1): 33-48. 
Hegre, Håvard, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Ranveig
Gissinger, 2003. ‘Globalization and Internal
Conflict’, pp. 251–275 in Schneider, Barbieri &
Gleditsch (2003). 
Hirschman, Albert O., 1945/1980. National Power and
the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, CA, Los
Angeles, CA & London: University of California
Press. 
Hobbes, Thomas, 1651/1968. Leviathan. London:
Penguin. 
Holsti, Ole R., 1995. ‘Theories of International
Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and its
Challengers’ , in Charles W. Kegley, jr., ed.,
Controversies in International Relations Theory:
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St.
Martin’s (35–65). 
Kadera Kelly M., Crescenzi, Mark J. C., Shannon
Megan L., 2003. ‘Democratic Survival, Peace, and
War in the International System’, American Journal
of Political Science 47(2): 234–247. 
Kant, Immanuel, 1795/1991. ‘Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch’, in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant:
Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (93–130). 
Kegley, Charles, & Margaret Hermann, 1996. ‘How
Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected
Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace’,
Journal of Peace Research 33(3): 309-322. 
Keohane, Robert O., 1984. After Hegemony:
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye, jr., 1977. Power
and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition.
Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown. 
Kim, Soo Yeon, 1998. Ties that Bind: The Role of Trade
in International Conflict Processes, 1950–1992 .
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political
Science, Yale University. 
Le Billon, Philippe, 2001. ‘The Political Ecology of
War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’,
Political Geography 20(3):561–584. 
Liberman, Peter, 1993. ‘The Spoils of Conquest’,
International Security 18(2): 125–153. 
Lipset, Seymour M., 1959. ‘Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy’,  American Political Science Review
53(1): 69–106. 
Londregan, John B. & Keith T. Poole, 1996. ‘Does
High Income Promote Democracy?’, World Politics
49(1): 1–30. 
Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder, 1995.
‘Democratization and the Danger of War’,
International Security 20: 5-38. 
Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder, 1996. ‘The
44 Håvard HegreEffects of Democratization on War’, International
Security 20: 196-207. 
Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder, 2002.
‘Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength,
and War’, International Organization 56 (2): 297- 
Maoz, Zeev & Bruce M. Russett, 1992. ‘Alliance,
Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the
Lack of Conflict among Democracies a Statistical
Artifact?’,  International Interactions 18(3): 245-
267. 
Maoz, Zeev & Bruce M. Russett, 1993. ‘Normative
and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-
1986’,  American Political Science Review 87(3):
624-638. 
Mearsheimer, John J., 1990. ‘Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe After the Cold War’,
International Security 15(1): 5-56. 
Mearsheimer, John J., 1995. ‘The False Promise of
International Institutions’, International Security
19(3): 5-49. 
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin; Scott Gates & Håvard
Hegre, 1999. ‘Evolution in Democracy-War
Dynamics’,  Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (6):
771–792. 
Morrow, James D., 1999. ‘How Could Trade Affect
Conflict?’,  Journal of Peace Research 36(4):
481–489. 
Mosher, J. S., 2003. ‘Relative Gains Concerns When
the Number of States In the International System
Increases’,  Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(5):
642–668. 
Mousseau, Michael, 2000. ‘Market Prosperity,
Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(4): 472-507. 
Mousseau, Michael; Håvard Hegre & John Oneal,
2003. ‘How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the
Liberal Peace’, European Journal of International
Relations 9(2):277-314. 
Muller, Edward N, 1985. ‘Income Inequality, Regime
Repressiveness, and Political Violence’, American
Sociological Review 50(1):47–61. 
Muller, Edward N. & Erich Weede, 1990. ‘Cross-
National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational
Action Approach’, Journal of Conflict Resolution
34:624–51. 
Oneal, John R. & Bruce M. Russett, 1997. ‘The
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-85’,
International Studies Quarterly 41(2): 267-294. 
Oneal, John R. & Bruce M. Russett, 1999a. ‘Assessing
the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications:
Trade Still Reduces Conflict’, Journal of Peace
Research 36(4): 423-442. 
Oneal, John R. & Bruce M. Russett, 1999b. ‘The
Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations,
1885-1992’, World Politics 52(1): 1-37. 
Organski, A.F.K. & Jacek Kugler, 1980. The War
Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Peceny, Mark; Caroline C. Beer & Shannon Sanchez-
Terry, 2002. ‘Dictatorial Peace?’ American Political
Science Review 96(1):15–26. 
Polachek, Solomon W., 1980. ‘Conflict and Trade’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(1): 55-78. 
Polachek, Solomon W.; John Robst & Yuan-Ching
Chang, 1999. ‘Liberalism and Interdependence:
Extending the Trade-Conflict Model’, Journal of
Peace Research 36(4): 405-422. 
Pollins, Brian M., 1989. ‘Does Trade Still Follow the
Flag?’,  American Political Science Review 83(2):
465-480. 
Powell, Robert, 1991. ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in
International Relations Theory’, American Political
Science Review 85(4): 1303-1320. 
Powell, Robert, 1996. ‘Stability and the Distribution of
Power’, World Politics 48(2): 239–267. 
Przeworski, Adam; Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio
Cheibub, & Fernando Limongi., 2000. Democracy
and Development. Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam & Fernando Limongi, 1997.
‘Modernization: Theory and Facts’, World Politics
49:155–183. 
Raknerud, Arvid & Håvard Hegre, 1997. ‘The Hazard
of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the
Democratic Peace’, Journal of Peace Research 34(4):
385-404. 
Ray, James Lee, 1995. Democracy and International
Conflict. Columbus, SC: University of South
Carolina Press. 
Reuveny, Rafael & Heejon Kang, 1996. ‘International
Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger
Causality’,  American Journal of Political Science
40(3): 943-970. 
Reuveny, Rafael & Heejon Kang, 1998. ‘Bilateral Trade
and Political Conflict/Cooperation: Do Goods
Matter?’, Journal of Peace Research 35(5): 581
Rosecrance, Richard, 1986. The Rise of the Trading
State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World.
New York: Basic Books. 
Rosecrance, Richard, 1996. ‘The Rise of the Virtual
State’, Foreign Affairs 75(4): 45-61. 
Ross, Michael, 2001. ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’,
World Politics 53(April):325–61. 
Rummel, Rudolph J., 1979. War, Power, Peace, vol. 4 of
Understanding Conflict and War. Beverly Hills, CA
and London: SAGE. 
Rummel, Rudolph J., 1983. ‘Libertarianism and
International Violence’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 27(1): 27-71. 
Rummel, Rudolph J., 1995. Democracies ARE More
Peaceful than Other Countries. European Journal of
International Relations 1: 457-479. 
Development and the liberal peace 45Russett, Bruce M., 1993. Grasping the Democratic
Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Russett, Bruce M. & John R. Oneal, 2001.
Triangulating Peace. Democracy, Interdependence,
and International Organizations. New York, NY:
Norton. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Andrew Warner, 1995. ‘Natural
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 5398. 
Sambanis, Nicholas, 2001. ‘Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic
Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical
and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 45(3):259–282. 
Skaperdas, Stergios & Constantinos Syropoulos, 1996.
‘Competitive Trade with Conflict,’ in Michelle R.
Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, eds., The Political
Economy of Conflict and Appropriation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press (73-96). 
Small, Melvin & J. David Singer, 1976. ‘The War-
Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965’,
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1(4): 50-
69. 
Snyder, Glenn H., 1984. ‘The Security Dilemma in
Alliance Politics’, World Politics 36(4): 461-495. 
Snyder, Jack, 2000. From Voting to Violence:
Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New
York, NY: Norton. 
de Soysa, Indra, 2000. ‘The Resource Curse: Are Civil
Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?’ In Mats
Berdal & David Malone, eds, Greed and Grievance:
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner. 
de Soysa, Indra, 2002. ‘Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed,
Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989–99’,
Journal of Peace Research 39(4): 395–416. 
Vanhanen, Tatu, 1997. Prospects of Democracy: A Study
of 172 Countries. London & New York: Routledge. 
Wagner, R. Harrison, 2000. ‘Bargaining and War’,
American Journal of Political Science 44(3):
469–484. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1974. ‘The Rise and Future
Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts
for Comparative Analysis’, Comparative Studies in
Society and History 16(2): 387–415. 
Waltz, Kenneth, 1979. Theory of International Politics.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Wantchekon, Leonard, 2000. ‘Why do Resource
Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian
Governments’, Ms., Yale University, February 6. 
Ward, Michael D., & Kristian S. Gleditsch, 1998.
‘Democratizing for Peace’, American Political
Science Review 92(1): 51–62. 
Weede, Erich, 1984. ‘Democracy and War
Involvement’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(4):
649-664. 
Weede, Erich, 1995. ‘Economic Policy and
International Security Rent Seeking, Free Trade,
and Democratic Peace’, European Journal of
International Relations 1(4): 519–537. 
Weingast, Barry R., 1997. ‘The Political Foundations
of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, American
Political Science Review 91(2): 245-263. 
Zacher, Mark W. & Richard A. Matthews, 1995.
‘Liberal International Theory: Common Threads,
Divergent Strands’ , in Charles W. Kegley, jr., ed.,
Controversies in International Relations Theory:
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge. New York: St.
Martin’s (107–150). 
46 Håvard Hegre